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ABSTRACT
Recent literature suggests that historical accidents can trap economies in ine¢cient equilibria. In a
prototype model in the literature, there are two locations, the productive South and the unproductive
North. By accident of history, the industry starts in the North. Because of agglomeration economies,
the industry may reside in the North forever—an ine¢cient outcome. This paper modi…es the
standard model by assuming there is a continuum of locations between the North and the South.
Productivity gradually increases as one moves South. There is a unique long-run equilibrium in this
economy where all agents locate at the most productive locations.
¤The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
Recently, the possibility of multiple equilibria under increasing returns has received much
attention. Work by Farrell and Saloner (1985), Arthur (1989), and Krugman (1991a) has emphasized
that in such situations equilibrium outcomes may be determined by accidents of history. Moreover,
the equilibrium selected by the historical accident may turn out to be ine¢cient. In this paper,
I make a slight modi…cation in the existing prototype model and show that the economy always
migrates to the e¢cient location pattern.
The underlying ideas in this literature can be illustrated with a simple example. Suppose
there are two possible locations for production in an industry, the North and the South. Suppose
that the South is better suited for production in this industry than the North, so that in an e¢cient
allocation the entire industry is in the South. By accident of history, the industry starts in the North.
If agglomeration economies are important, the industry may be trapped in the North forever—an
ine¢cient outcome. This can happen if the value of the agglomeration bene…ts in the North to an
individual producer exceeds the bene…t of the natural advantage of the South.
This paper considers two modi…cations to this standard model. The …rst modi…cation is that
instead of there being two discrete locations, North and South, there is a continuum of locations
along a North-South axis. The natural suitability for production gradually gets better as one moves
South until some southernmost endpoint is reached. The second modi…cation is that space is a
scarce resource in the model. It is not feasible to concentrate all production at a single point.
Rather, production must be spread out over an interval of locations.
The main result of this paper is that there is a unique long-run equilibrium in this economy
in which all production occurs in the most e¢cient locations. If by historical accident the industry is
initially at the north end of the location spectrum, the industry will eventually migrate to the more
suitable territory at the south end of the location spectrum. In some cases the migration is abrupt,
with all new entrants in the initial period jumping immediately to the most e¢cient locations at the
south end of the location spectrum. In other cases the migration is gradual, with each new cohort
of entrants shifting the center of the industry south by a small step. I call this latter type of case a
step-by-step migration.
To obtain my result, it is not enough to simply assume a continuum of locations. It is also
necessary to make space a scarce resource. If I did not add this second modi…cation onto the model,
there might exist a continuum of equilibria in the economy with each point x in the location space
being a possible equilibrium production site. To see why, suppose a particular agent takes as giventhat all the other agents in the economy will locate at a point x. If this particular agent were to
deviate from the location x, it would lead to a …rst-order loss in the particular agent’s welfare, if
transportation costs are big compared to the rate at which the natural advantage increases as one
moves south. Hence, there could be an equilibrium where all agents locate at any ine¢cient point
x.
This logic breaks down when space is a scarce resource. Suppose that the industry were
initially located towards the north end of the location spectrum. By assumption, the industry
cannot be concentrated at single point, so suppose the industry is spread out over an interval [x;x].
First consider the case where the natural suitability for production does not vary by location. In this
case, the most desirable location in the economy would be at the industry center c ´
x+x
2 because
this central location would minimize transportation costs. Because the center would be the best
location in this case, the cost of a small deviation from the center would only be a second-order
loss. Now suppose that suitability for production increases as one moves south. Here, there is a
…rst-order gain to deviating from the center and making a slight movement in the direction of the
South. This …rst-order gain outweighs any second-order cost from an increase in transportation
costs. Therefore, if the industry is initially located on some interval [x;x], the new agents entering
the economy will prefer to locate at a point that is south of the center of this existing industry. This
force tends to shift the center of the industry further south in each period. It prevents the industry
from getting stuck at an ine¢cient set of locations in the North.
While the industry always occupies the e¢cient locations in the long run, the equilibrium
transition path is not necessarily e¢cient. For certain parameters, a social planner might specify
that the industry immediately jump to the best locations at the south end of the location spectrum.
While there always exists an equilibrium that decentralizes the planner’s solution that the industry
jump, in some cases there also exists a second, ine¢cient, equilibrium transition path where the
industry migrates in a gradual, step-by-step, fashion. Thus, there may exist an equilibrium path
where the transition is slower than what a planner would do. The reverse is also true. There may
exist an equilibrium where the migration is too fast—the industry takes a jump along the equilibrium
path, but the planner would move the industry in a step-by-step fashion.
The theme of this paper is that market forces have a way of preventing economies from
getting trapped forever in ine¢cient allocations. A variety of recent papers have made similar
points. Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) present a number of arguments that discount the importance
of lock-in. Rauch (1993) argues that if an economy were initially in an ine¢cient location, agents
2(land developers) would emerge to coordinate the migration to the e¢cient location. This is a
Coasian argument for why we should expect e¢ciency. My paper is fundamentally di¤erent from
the Rauch paper because the e¢cient location is obtained in the long run without the help of any
analog of land developers to coordinate the migration. My paper is closely related to a previous
paper, Holmes (1996), which considers an environment with two discrete locations, North and South,
but a continuum of di¤erent product qualities. In this previous paper, low quality products migrate
to the South …rst, and they are followed by successively higher quality products. In the previous
paper, it is possible for part of the industry to remain stuck in the North if the natural advantage
of the South is small enough. The current paper is di¤erent in that the unique long-run equilibrium
is for all production to be in the South, for any positive natural advantage of the South, no matter
how small.
This paper is also related to the literature on vintage capital models. At the beginning of
each period there exists a capital stock from past investments that is tied down to a particular set
of locations. The question faced in this economy is where to build the new factories. There is a
bene…t to building the new plants as far south as possible because land becomes more productive as
one moves south. The bigger the step size south in each period, the larger rate of growth in welfare
measures from one period to the next. But this dynamic gain of a larger step size comes at a static
cost in any given period. The further south the new plants are, the further the new plants are away
from the existing plants. This is problematic because separating the new plants from the old plants
precludes the agglomeration bene…ts that would emerge if old and new were near each other. The
trade-o¤ in costs and bene…ts from increasing the step size is analogous to the trade-o¤ found in
vintage capital models such as those in Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), Parente (1994), and Jovanovic
and Nyarko (1996). In these models, the bene…ts of faster adoption of new technologies must be
weighed against the cost of increasing the rate of obsolescence of past investments. Jovanovic and
Nyarko (1996) ask the question of whether or not it would ever be optimal to stop adopting new
technologies in light of this trade-o¤. They …nd that it may be optimal to stop at a technology
level below that maximum level. In my related but di¤erent structure, it is never optimal, nor is it
ever an equilibrium for the economy to get stuck in an allocation where productivity is less than its
maximum possible level.
32. The Static Model
This section describes and analyzes a static version of the model. I begin with the static
model because it is easier to explain that the dynamic model and much of the intuition for what
happens in the dynamic case follows from what happens in the static case. I extend the model to
the dynamic case in the next section.
Agglomeration bene…ts emerge in the model because producers value access to a large variety
of local specialist suppliers. To model this, I follow the recent literature, e.g., Abdel-Rahman (1988)
and Krugman (1991b), in applying the structure of the Spence (1976) and Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)
formulations to a geographic context.
A. Description of the Model
The set of locations in the economy is the interval [0;»].1 Locations are indexed by x 2 [0;»].
The higher is x, the further south is the location.
There are two kinds of agents in the economy, suppliers and assemblers. Suppliers employ an
outside good called dollars to manufacture intermediate inputs. Assemblers use these intermediate
inputs to manufacture the single …nal good. The price of the single …nal good is normalized to one
dollar.
There is a continuum of suppliers indexed by s on the interval [0;¾], where ¾ < ». Each
supplier chooses a location x to set up a factory. Let `s(s) 2 [0;»] be the location choice of supplier
s. Each point x in the location space can hold at most a single supplier. Formally, in a feasible set
of location decisions, `s(s0) 6= `s(s00), if s0 6= s00. For example, one feasible allocation is for suppliers
to locate on the interval [0;¾]; i.e., `s(s) = s. Note that my earlier assumption that ¾ < » implies
that there is more than enough room in the location space [0;»] to …t the entire set of suppliers.
The locations vary in the marginal cost to produce intermediate inputs. The marginal cost
at location x is e¡µx dollars. Thus at location x = 0 marginal cost is unity, and the marginal cost
decreases with x at the rate of µ per unit distance.
Suppliers di¤er in the variety of input that they supply, in addition to di¤ering in their
location. For example, in the automobile industry, suppliers di¤er in their product, e.g., windshield
wipers or seat belts, in addition to di¤ering in the address of their plants. There is a continuum
of input varieties indexed by y 2 [0;1). Let y(s) denote the variety choice by supplier s. Each
1Krugman and Venables (1995) also consider an environment in which the location space is a continuum. The
issues they consider are very di¤erent from the issues considered here.
4supplier s also chooses a price p(s) denominated in dollars.
There is a continuum of assemblers in the economy indexed by a on the interval [0;®].
Each assembler constructs units of a composite intermediate input from the output of the suppliers.
Suppose a particular assembler employs an amount h(y) of each specialized input y. The production










where ¸ is the constant elasticity of substitution. This production function is standard in the
literature (e.g., Abdel-Rahman (1988), Krugman (1991b)). As is standard in the literature, assume
that ¸ > 1. De…ne the markup parameter ¹ to be ¹ ´ ¸
¸¡1. The bigger is ¹, the stronger is the
preference for variety.
Assemblers convert the m units of the composite intermediate input to q units of the …nal




The parameter Á is the elasticity of supply with respect to changes in the price of the composite
intermediate input. Assume Á > 1.
Assemblers incur a transportation cost when acquiring intermediate inputs. Suppose an
assembler locates at xa and purchases an intermediate input produced at x. Of the amount shipped,
a fraction e¡¿jxa¡xj survives the trip, and a fraction 1 ¡ e¡¿jxa¡xj is dissipated as a transportation
cost. The bigger is the transportation cost parameter ¿, the greater is the output lost in transit.
This is an iceberg transportation cost as in Krugman (1991b).
I consider two alternative cases regarding feasible distributions of assemblers.
Case 1. The distribution of assemblers can be any arbitrary distribution, including a mass point at
a single location. Formally, the location choice function `a(a) can be any function mapping from
the set of assemblers [0;®] to the set of locations [0;»].
Case 2. There is room at each location x for at most a single assembler and a single supplier.
Formally, the location choice function `a(a) must be such that `a(a0) 6= `a(a00), if a0 6= a00.
In Case 1, space is not a scarce resource for assemblers. In this case, the analysis is very
tractable, enabling me to obtain general results. Case 2 is a more plausible case, since this case
makes space a scarce resource for assemblers just as it is for suppliers. But the analysis of this case
is fairly complex, and my results for this case are more limited than my results for Case 1.
5B. Equilibrium in the Static Model
An allocation in this economy is a set of functions f`s(¢);y(¢);p(¢);`a(¢);q(¢);h(¢;¢)g where
`s(s), y(s), and p(s) specify for each supplier s the location choice, the variety choice, and the
price choice and `a(a), q(a), h(s;a) specify for each assembler a the location choice, the quantity of
…nal-good output, and the demand for specialized inputs from supplier s. A feasible allocation is
one where the location choices of the agents are feasible and the output levels are feasible given the
input levels.
All agents in the economy make their decisions simultaneously. When supplier s chooses
its location `s(s) and its price p(s), it takes as given the location decisions of the other suppliers
`s(¢), the location decisions of the assemblers `a(¢), and the output levels of the other suppliers
h(¢;¢). Analogously, when assemblers make their location decisions, they take as given the location
decisions of all the other agents in the economy and the prices of the various specialized-intermediate
inputs. An equilibrium in this economy is a feasible allocation in which each agent maximizes pro…ts
given the set of choices available to the agent.
To determine the equilibrium, note …rst that each supplier will obviously pick a di¤erent
variety y to produce, and given the symmetry of (1), it is irrelevant which one each selects. Following
standard arguments, it is pro…t-maximizing for each supplier to set price equal to a constant markup
¹ over cost. A supplier at location x has a marginal cost of e¡µx dollars. Hence, the price of a good
produced at location x, before transportation costs, is
p(x) = ¹e¡µx: (3)
Suppose an assembler is located at xa and purchases a specialized input from a supplier at location
x. A fraction e¡¿jxa¡xj remains after the transportation costs, so in order to receive one delivered
unit, the assembler has to purchase e¿jxa¡xj units. Hence, the delivered price of one unit of good
produced at x delivered to xa is
pd(x;xa) = ¹e¡µx+¿jxa¡xj. (4)
It is useful to introduce some additional notation. Take as given that the location choices of
suppliers are given by some function `s(¢), and take as given that suppliers price according to the
rule (3). Taking the locations and prices as given, let v(x) be the minimum cost of constructing one
unit of the composite intermediate input at location x. It is clear that the problem of picking the
location that maximizes the assembler’s pro…t is equivalent to the problem of picking the location
6with the lowest cost v(x) of the composite intermediate. Analysis of the problem of minimizing the
cost of constructing one unit of the composite yields the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Take as given that suppliers locate on the interval [cs ¡ ¾
2;cs + ¾
2] with center cs and
that suppliers price according to (3). The cost of the composite intermediate v(x) is u-shaped as a
function of x; and the minimum is attained at a point ca¤ strictly further south than the supplier
network center cs; i.e., ca¤ > cs. Furthermore, v(cs +y) < v(cs ¡y) for all y > 0; i.e., the composite
cost at a location y units south of the center is less than the composite cost at a location y units
north of the center.
The proof is in the appendix. To see the intuition, suppose an assembler were to locate at
the center of the supplier network cs. The price of intermediate inputs to the south of the center is
less than the price of intermediate inputs to the north of the center. This follows because price is a
constant markup over cost, and marginal cost falls as one moves south. Hence, an assembler located
at cs would tend to substitute away from inputs produced north of cs towards inputs produced
south of cs. Since more than half of the total inputs purchased are obtained from suppliers south
of cs, such an assembler can lower its transportation cost bill by shifting its location south of cs.
It is worth noting that a key assumption underlying this result is that suppliers are spread out on
the interval [cs ¡ ¾
2;cs + ¾
2]. If instead, it were feasible for the mass of suppliers to concentrate at a
single point cs, the optimal assembly location would be at the center cs.
Lemma 1 implies the following about the optimal location decisions of assemblers given that
suppliers are located on the interval [cs ¡ ¾
2;cs + ¾
2]. In Case 1, they all concentrate at the single
point ca¤ that minimizes v(x). In Case 2 where assemblers are forced to spread out, the lemma
implies that either they all concentrate on the interval [» ¡ ®;»] at the southernmost end of the
location space or they concentrate on an interval [ca¡ ®
2;ca+ ®
2] with a center that is strictly further
south than the center of the supplier network; i.e., ca > cs. In either Case 1 or Case 2, the result is
the same that the assembly center is strictly further south than the supplier center.2
Now consider the location choices of specialized-input suppliers. Each supplier takes as given
the location choices of the other suppliers `s(¢), the location choices of the assemblers `a(¢), and the
production levels h(¢;¢) of the other suppliers. Let ¼s(x) be supplier pro…t at location x, taking as
given the choices of all the other agents.
2This statement assumes that ® < ¾. In Case 2, if ® > ¾ and assemblers and suppliers are both at the south end
of the location space, then the center of assembly will be further north than the center of the suppliers.
7At this point it is convenient to provide a separate treatment of the two alternative cases.
Case 1
Consider Case 1 where it is feasible to concentrate all assemblers at a single point ca. The
following lemma provides a formula for how supplier pro…t ¼s(x) depends upon the location of the
supplier.
Lemma 2. Suppose that Case 1 applies and that all assemblers are concentrated at the point ca.




where k is a positive constant that is independent of x. This function is single-peaked and has the
property that ¼s(ca + y) > ¼s(ca ¡ y) for all y > 0.
According to Lemma 2, the pro…t at a location y units south of the assembly center ca is
strictly greater than the pro…t at a location y units north of the center. The intuition for this is
straightforward. The transportation cost to ca is the same from both points, but the marginal cost
of production is lower at the more southern point ca+y than the more northern point ca¡y. Given
the shape of the pro…t function speci…ed in Lemma 2, the optimal location choices of the suppliers
will be an interval [cs0 ¡ ¾
2;cs0 + ¾
2] with some center cs0 south of the assembly center ca. This is
illustrated in Figure 1. There the thick black line segment is the set of points of measure ¾ with the
highest pro…t. The center of the set of pro…t-maximizing points is strictly further south than the
assembly center ca.
It is important for this result that it is not possible to concentrate all the suppliers at the
same point. If µ < ¿, then the pro…t-maximizing supplier location is at the assembly center ca, as in
Figure 1. Hence, if it were feasible for all suppliers to concentrate at a single point and if µ < ¿, any
location point could be an equilibrium location point. Given that the mass of assembly activity is at
an arbitrary point ca, all suppliers would locate there, and this would make it optimal for assemblers
to locate at ca. In contrast, if suppliers are forced to spread out as assumed here, even though the
maximum supplier pro…t for µ < ¿ is at ca, because the pro…t function ¼s(¢) is asymmetric around
ca, the center of the set of pro…t-maximizing supplier locations is strictly greater than ca.
I can now state the main result for this section.
Proposition 1. Assume that Case 1 applies. There exists a unique equilibrium. In the equilibrium
8allocation, suppliers locate on the interval [» ¡ ¾;»] with center cs¤ ´ » ¡ ¾
2 at the southernmost
end of the location space. Assemblers locate at a point ca¤ satisfying ca¤ > » ¡ ¾
2 ´ cs¤.
This proposition says that in the unique equilibrium of this economy, suppliers occupy the
e¢cient locations at the south end. To get an idea of how the proof goes, suppose to the contrary
that suppliers locate on an interval [x¡¾;x] that is not at the southernmost end, i.e., where x < ».
Lemma 1 implies assemblers will occupy a point ca that is south of the center cs = x ¡ ¾
2 of the
supplier interval. Lemma 2 then implies that the pro…t ¼(x) at the south end of the supplier network
is bigger than the pro…t ¼(x ¡ ¾) at the north end of the network. This implies that there exist
unoccupied locations just south of the supplier network that yield greater pro…t than some locations
within the supplier network. This is inconsistent with equilibrium.
The above argument eliminates from being possible equilibrium allocations where suppliers
occupy an interval [x ¡ ¾;x] with x < ». The proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix shows that
a location pattern where suppliers are not distributed along an interval cannot be an equilibrium.
The only possibility left is the case where suppliers occupy the interval [» ¡ ¾;»] at the south end
of the location spectrum. It is immediate from Lemmas 1 and 2 that this location pattern is an
equilibrium location pattern.
Case 2
Now consider Case 2 where assemblers are forced to spread out. Suppose that assemblers
occupy an interval [ca ¡ ®
2;ca + ®
2]. The pro…t of a supplier at x, taking as given the choices of all







where ~ ¼(x;xa) is the pro…t a supplier at x earns on sales to an assembler at xa.
The fact that there is an interval of assembler locations makes the analysis here more com-
plicated than the analysis for Case 1. Here there are trade-o¤s in the comparison of supplier pro…t
between a location at the assembler center ca and an alternative site x0 north of ca. A disadvantage
of the x0 location is that pro…ts from sales to assemblers south of ca are lower for a supplier at the x0
location than for a supplier at the ca location; i.e., ~ ¼(x0;xa) < ~ ¼(ca;xa), for xa ¸ ca. But if µ < ¿,
location x0 yields higher pro…ts on assemblers located north of x0; i.e., ~ ¼(x0;xa) > ~ ¼(ca;xa), xa ¸ x0.
These trade-o¤s make it di¢cult to compare supplier pro…t at alternate locations. Nevertheless, it
is possible to prove some analytical results, including
9Lemma 3. Assume that Case 2 applies and that ® · ¾. Assume that suppliers and assemblers
are distributed on the intervals [cs ¡ ¾
2;cs + ¾
2] and [ca ¡ ®
2;ca + ®
2] and that cs ¸ ca. Under these
assumptions, ¼s(cs + ¾
2) > ¼s(cs ¡ ¾
2).
This result is analogous to the result of Lemma 2 for Case 1. The result says that if the
assembler center is at least as far south as the supplier center, then pro…t at the southern end of
the supplier interval is strictly greater than the pro…t at the northern end of the supplier interval.
Intuition suggests that this result should follow from the fact that costs fall as one moves south.
But I should note the assumption that assembler demand for the composite is elastic, Á > 1, also
plays a role in the result. An elastic demand ensures that total spending on intermediate inputs is
greater for assemblers located near the south end of the supplier network (where locally produced
inputs are relatively cheap) than for assemblers located near the north end of the supplier network
(where locally produced inputs are relatively expensive).3
Lemma 3 along with Lemma 1 implies
Proposition 2. Assume that Case 2 applies and that ® · ¾. An allocation in which suppliers
locate on an interval [x ¡ ¾;x] for x < » cannot be an equilibrium allocation.
The proof of Proposition 2 follows the same arguments given in the discussion of Case 1.
Suppose suppliers occupied an interval [x¡¾;x] not at the south end; i.e., x < » . Assemblers would
locate at an interval with a center further south than the supplier center. (Note the assumption that
® · ¾ guarantees that this is feasible). Lemma 3 implies that the pro…t at unoccupied locations
just south of the supplier interval is greater than the pro…t at the north end of the supplier interval.
This is inconsistent with equilibrium.
From Proposition 2, we know that if an interval of supplier locations [x ¡ ¾;x] is not at the
south end, it cannot be an equilibrium. The next issue is whether or not an interval of supplier
locations at the south end can be an equilibrium. My results on this issue are arrived at in two
3Supplier pro…ts are a constant fraction
¹¡1
¹ of revenues. Consider an alternative version of the model where
assemblers have an inelastic demand for one unit of the composite intermediate. An assembler located at the north
end of the supplier interval will pay a higher price for this one composite unit than an assembler located at the south
end. Since supplier pro…ts are a constant portion
¹¡1
¹ of revenues, aggregate supplier pro…t derived from assemblers
at the north end will be greater than aggregate supplier pro…t derived from assemblers at the south end. If the
transportation cost parameter ¿ is large enough, most of the aggregate supplier pro…t from assemblers at the north
end will go to suppliers at the north end. This makes the north end of the supplier interval attractive to suppliers
when ¿ is large.
10di¤erent ways, analytical methods and numerical computations. For the case in which the elasticity
of assembler composite demand Á is relatively big, I have obtained the following analytical result:
Proposition 3. Assume that Case 2 applies, that ® · ¾, and that Á ¸ ¸. There exists an
equilibrium where suppliers occupy the interval [» ¡¾;»] at the south end of the location spectrum.
The proposition assumes that the elasticity of composite demand is bigger than the elasticity
of demand for individual specialized inputs. The remaining case where Á 2 (1;¸) is di¢cult to
analyze because the pro…t function ¼(x) is not always single-peaked.4 (This makes things di¢cult
because I have to show that the pro…t at ¼(»¡¾) is less than the pro…t in the interior of the interval
(» ¡¾;»):) Hence, for this case I have been forced to look at numerical examples. In the examples I
considered, an equilibrium with suppliers bunched at the south end always existed, even for extreme
values of the parameters. On the basis of this numerical analysis, I conjecture that the statement
in Proposition 3 also applies for the case of Á 2 (1;¸).
The assumption that ® · ¾ is important for Proposition 3. Suppose ® is much bigger than
¾ and that suppliers occupy the locations [»¡¾;»] at the south end of the location spectrum. Since
® is much bigger than ¾, the supplier network would be far from the center » ¡ ®
2 of the assembler
locations [»¡®;»]. If the transportation cost parameter ¿ is big enough, it is clear that this allocation
would be neither an e¢cient allocation nor an equilibrium allocation. Rather, it would be e¢cient
to shift suppliers closer to the center of the assembler locations and to spread the suppliers out as
well, and these forces will be re‡ected in any equilibrium allocation.
3. The Dynamic Model
Now consider an overlapping generations version of the model. In each period t, a measure
¾ of suppliers enters the economy. Suppliers live for two periods. When young, a supplier s makes
a location decision that is …xed over the two periods of the supplier’s life. Let `s
t(s) denote the
location decision of supplier s born in period t. Assume that each location x can be occupied by at
most a single old supplier and a single young supplier. Under this assumption the two generations
can overlap in space as well as time.5
4Suppose that ® = ¾ and that Á is close to one. If ¿ is big enough, there may be humps in ¼(x) close to both of
the endpoints in the supplier interval.
5An alternative approach is to assume that each location can be occupied by at most one supplier, young or old.
This alternative assumption is perhaps more realistic. However, the results under this alternative assumption are
qualitatively the same as my results. In addition, this alternative assumption comes at the cost of making the analysis
somewhat awkward.
11There is a measure ® of assemblers in each period. To keep the analysis simple, assume
that Case 1 applies so that assemblers can concentrate at a single point. Also, to keep the analysis
simple, assume that assemblers can alter their location every period.
In the beginning of period t, the state variable in the economy is the set of location decisions
`s
t¡1(¢) made by the suppliers that entered in the previous period. Let t = 1 be the initial period.
Let the locations `s
0(¢) of the old suppliers alive at the beginning of period t = 1 be the initial state.
Assume agents in the economy act to maximized discounted pro…ts and use a discount factor
of ± 2 [0;1). It is straightforward to extend the de…nition of equilibrium in the static case to
equilibrium in this dynamic case.
A stationary equilibrium in this economy is an initial state `s
0(¢) and a set of choices by each
agent in each period such that each agent is maximizing pro…t given the choices of the other agents
and such that all new entering cohorts of suppliers select the same locations as the old suppliers in
the initial state. The arguments used in the proof of Proposition 1 apply to
Proposition 4. There exists a unique stationary equilibrium in which each generation of suppliers
is located on the interval [»¡¾;»] with center cs¤ ´ »¡ ¾
2. Assemblers locate at a point ca¤ satisfying
ca¤ > » ¡ ¾
2 ´ cs¤.
Suppose that the initial state is such that the old suppliers are located on the interval [0;¾] at
the north end of the location spectrum. Think of this as being due to some historical accident. Will
the economy converge to the steady state? Will it do so in …nite time? How does an equilibrium
transition path compare with the path of a social planner? This rest of this section addresses these
questions. But before I tackle these questions, I need to digress and make a distinction between
fragmented and unfragmented allocations.
A. A Focus on Unfragmented Allocations
An unfragmented allocation is an allocation where, in each period, the entire measure ® of
assemblers is concentrated at a single point ca





2]. A fragmented allocation is where at least one of these two conditions is
not satis…ed in some period.
In the family of models considered in this paper, a fragmented equilibrium often exists, and
such an equilibrium is often ine¢cient (though it should be noted that these equilibria are usually
unstable). For example, in a model with two discrete locations, North and South, there might be an
12equilibrium where half the assemblers locate in the North and half locate in the South. This might
be an equilibrium since, given that the agglomeration bene…ts are the same at the two locations,
assemblers might be indi¤erent between the two locations. Such an equilibrium might be ine¢cient
because all might be better o¤ if the entire industry were concentrated in one location allowing for
a greater level of agglomeration bene…ts.
For this model, I know from Proposition 1 that, for the static case, there does not exist a
fragmented equilibrium. I know from Proposition 4 that, for the dynamic model, the allocation in
the unique stationary equilibrium is unfragmented. Outside of the stationary case, I do not know
whether or not there exists an equilibrium in the dynamic model in which there is any fragmentation
along the equilibrium path. I do know that I can make small changes in the model which allow
the possibility of a fragmented equilibrium.6 The existence of old suppliers in …xed locations that
do not necessarily maximize current pro…t is crucial for this construction. (In the static model all
locations have to maximize current pro…t, and a fragmented equilibrium is impossible.)
In this section, I avoid the di¢culties inherent in analyzing fragmented equilibria by restrict-
ing attention to unfragmented equilibria. This allows me to focus on the main question posed in
the introduction: namely, suppose an industry is initially concentrated in an ine¢cient northern
location; does the industry eventually migrate to the more e¢cient southern location? By ignoring
fragmented equilibria I am unable to address a di¤erent question: namely, suppose that assembly
operations are fragmented in an ine¢cient way across space; what market forces operate to ensure
the industry is eventually concentrated in an e¢cient way? At this point I can only say that in the
static version of the model an ine¢cient fragmented equilibrium is impossible. The dynamic case
allowing the possibility of fragmentation along the equilibrium path is left for future research.
B. Does the Industry Migrate South?
This subsection asks whether or not the industry eventually migrates to the southern end of
the location spectrum, given that the initial old suppliers are located at the northern end of the





6For example, suppose that in the initial period the old suppliers occupy the unit interval [0;1]. I can construct
an example where the new suppliers have a measure ¾ = 0:9 in which there exists an equilibrium with fragmented
assemblers in the initial period. In this example equilibrium, the new suppliers locate on the interval [1:7;2:6] in the
initial period. A small fraction of the assemblers locate at a point close to the center of the old-supplier network, and
the remaining assemblers locate at a point near the center of the new-supplier network.
13For technical reasons it is convenient to assume there is a …nite horizon T in the economy, where T
is large and T > ^ t. My result is
Proposition 5. Suppose that in the initial state old suppliers occupy the interval [0;¾]. In any
unfragmented equilibrium, there exists a critical time period t0; where t0 · ^ t, such that in any period
t ¸ t0, all new suppliers locate on the interval [»¡¾;»] at the south end of the location space. Before




2] with center cs
t, and this center shifts
south by at least µ¾
2¿ in each period; i.e., cs
t > cs
t¡1 + µ¾
2¿, for t · t0.
The result says that in any unfragmented equilibrium, the industry migrates south in a
monotone fashion. In each period the set of new suppliers shifts south at least by an amount µ¾
2¿ .
With a migration of this rate, the industry necessarily bangs up against the southern endpoint of
the location spectrum by period ^ t.
Proposition 4 does not say anything about whether or not an unfragmented equilibrium
exists. It is straightforward to show that an unfragmented equilibrium exists for the case of ± = 0.
I present an existence result for the case of ± > 0 in Proposition 9.
C. The Social Planner’s Solution
The previous subsection answers the question of whether or not the industry migrates south.
(It does). The next question is whether or not the transition path is e¢cient. As a …rst step
in answering this question, this subsection considers the problem of a social planner maximizing
discounted expected pro…t.
To make the analysis as simple as possible, I assume that each assembler has an inelastic
demand for one unit of the composite and uses this to produce one unit of the …nal good. All the
claims in Propositions 1, 4, and 5 apply for this alternative assumption, and it simpli…es the analysis
considerably here. Under this assumption, the only e¢ciency issue that needs to be considered is
the location decisions of the agents. Given a set of location decisions of the agents, the intermediate
goods are constructed in an e¢cient way in the equilibrium allocation. Even though there is a wedge
of ¹¡1 between the price and the marginal cost of each input, the wedge is the same for each good,
resulting in an e¢cient mix of each input.
Continuing to make things as simple as possible, assume that the discount factor ± = 0. Take
as given that in the initial state the old suppliers are on the interval [0;¾]. The assumption that
± = 0 implies that the problem of maximizing total surplus here reduces to solving for the assembler
14locations and new-supplier locations that minimize the average total cost in the period of delivering
one composite intermediate to each assembler. It is straightforward to show that in any solution to
this problem, all assemblers are concentrated in the same location ca. If µ < ¿, it is straightforward
to show that when assemblers locate at ca, the locations for the new suppliers that minimize average
total cost are the locations on the interval [x;x]; where













in the interior case de…ned by








x = » ¡ ¾ and x = x +¾ (8)
in the corner case de…ned by







In the interior case (7), this solution sets the marginal cost of supplying location ca at the north
end x of the interval equal to the marginal cost at the south end x, where marginal cost includes
transportation cost as well as production cost.
Figure 2 plots average total cost (ATC) as a function of the assembler location ca, taking
as given that the new suppliers are located on the interval given by (7), i.e., that the new-supplier
locations minimize average total cost given the assembler location ca. In this numerical example,
¾ = 1. The ATC function has a number of properties. At ca = 0:5, the center of the old suppliers,
this function is strictly decreasing. The function continues to decrease until it reaches a local
minimum at 0:7 which is within the network of old suppliers. Beyond 0:7, the function …rst increases
and then eventually decreases by so much that for large enough ca, the average total cost is less
than at the local minimum at 0:7.
The shape of the ATC function here has the following explanation. It is necessarily decreasing
at 0:5, the center point of the old-supplier network. This follows because even if the new suppliers
did not exist, it would minimize transportation costs on purchases from old suppliers alone to
shift the assembly location south of the old-supplier network center (recall Lemma 1). As ca is
increased beyond the old-supplier center 0:5, eventually for high enough ca there is a trade-o¤ from
increasing ca. Raising ca puts assemblers at a further distance from the old suppliers, which raises
15transportation costs. However, raising ca shifts the new suppliers further south, lowering their cost.
The local minimum at 0:7 is a point where these two o¤setting e¤ects balance. For a range of ca
beyond this point, the …rst e¤ect of an increase in ca on increasing transportation costs from old
suppliers dominates the second e¤ect of lowering the costs of the new suppliers. Eventually, however,
this reverses. For large enough ca, assemblers are buying so little from old suppliers that the e¤ect
is negligible, and the second e¤ect dominates. In the limit, as ca goes to in…nity, average total cost
goes to zero as the costs of the new suppliers goes to zero. Hence, for large enough ca, average total
cost is lower than at the local minimum for small ca.
If the cost decline parameter µ is large enough, the shape of the ATC function is di¤erent
from that in Figure 2, for it will be strictly decreasing over its entire range. To make the point I
want to make here, it is su¢cient to limit attention to the case where the ATC function takes the




ATC(ca) < ATC(¾) (9)
holds.7
The discussion of average total cost so far has ignored the fact there is an endpoint » of
the location space. This leads to minor modi…cations. Suppose, for example, that » = 2. The
parameters for this particular example imply that the cost-minimizing way to distribute the new
suppliers is for the center of the new suppliers cs
new to be equal to ca +0:1. So given that » = 2, the
endpoint constraint is not binding if ca < 1:4. So for ca < 1:4, the ATC when we take account of
the constraint is the same as without the constraint. For ca ¸ 1:4, the constraint is binding, so all
new suppliers are located at [1;2], for all ca in this range. The imposition of this endpoint constraint
shifts up the ATC for ca in the range [1:4;2]; as illustrated with the dotted lines in Figure 2. The
…gure also illustrates the analogous case of » = 3.
It is clear from inspection of Figure 2 that there are two possible forms for the solution to the
social planner’s problem. The …rst form is optimal if » is small. In this case the optimum is to set
the assembly center at the local optimum in the interior of the old-supplier network, i.e., at 0:7 in the
example. The new suppliers are located nearby according to the rule (7). Call this …rst possibility
the step-by-step strategy. In the example in the …gure, the step-by-step strategy is optimal, for




2. Since there is no cost advantage as one moves south, the optimum is obtained by placing assemblers in the
center of the interval of old suppliers and by exactly overlapping the interval of new suppliers with the interval of old
suppliers.
16instance, if » = 2. The second form the solution might take arises if » is large (e.g., » = 3 in the
example). In this case the optimal strategy is to immediately jump towards the southernmost end of
the interval by placing new suppliers on the interval [» ¡¾;»]. Call this second possibility the jump
strategy. Note that if in the initial period, the step-by-step strategy is optimal, then the step-by-step
strategy is optimal in all further periods since the relative return from the jump strategy falls. (The
distance between the center of the old suppliers and the south end of the location space falls each
period.) This discussion suggests the intuition for the following proposition, which is proved in the
appendix.
Proposition 6. Assume that µ is small enough that (9) holds. Assume that ± = 0. There exists a
critical level ^ » of » where ^ » > ¾ with the following properties. If » < ^ », the unique solution to the
social planner’s problem speci…es that the supplier center shift by a constant step z¤ < ¾ in each
period, cs
t = cs
t¡1+z¤, until the endpoint is reached where all suppliers are located at the south end
[» ¡ ¾;»]. If » > ^ », the unique solution speci…es that in the initial period the new suppliers jump
to the south end [» ¡¾;»] of the location spectrum and that all future generations of suppliers also
locate there.
Note that in the proposition if » < ^ » so that the step-by-step strategy is optimal, the step size
z¤ is less than ¾. Hence the old and new generations overlap geographically. There is a continuous
movement south; no locations are missed. If » > ^ »; there is a discontinuous jump to the South.
D. Is the Equilibrium Path E¢cient?
Now that I have characterized the social planner’s solution, I can relate it to the equilibrium
outcome.
Proposition 7. Assume that ± = 0. Then the social planner’s solution can be decentralized as an
equilibrium allocation.
Proposition 7 presents the good news that any socially e¢cient allocation can be decentralized
as an equilibrium allocation. It is a straightforward result. Taking ca as given, the social planner
picks the locations for the new suppliers that minimize average total cost, but these are the same
locations that maximize pro…t for the suppliers.
De…ne a step-by-step equilibrium to be the analog of the step-by-step form of the planner’s
solution. Speci…cally, in a step-by-step equilibrium, the center of the new-supplier interval shifts
17over by a constant amount z¤ < ¾ in each period, i.e., cs
t = cs
t¡1+z¤; and the location of assemblers
shifts over by a constant amount z¤ in each period, i.e., ca
t = ca
t¡1+z¤. These shifts take place until
the interval of new suppliers runs into the boundary at the southern endpoint, at which point the
shifts stop. The next proposition presents the bad news.
Proposition 8. Assume that ± = 0 and that µ is small enough so that (9) holds. Then for any »,
there exists a step-by-step equilibrium with a step size z¤ < ¾. Furthermore, there exists a »0 < ^ »,
such that if » 2 (»0;»], there also exists a jump equilibrium where all new suppliers locate at the
southern end [» ¡ ¾;»] beginning in the initial period.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 8, there exists a step-by-step equilibrium for any level
of ». It is straightforward to see why. The step-by-step approach is a local optimum for the social
planner. Given that all other new suppliers locate in the step-by-step formation, it is globally
optimal for an individual supplier to join the formation. However, for large », it is not globally
optimal for the social planner to take the step-by-step approach. This illustrates that the migration
south in the market allocation can be too slow; it is e¢cient to jump, but the market takes baby
steps. The second part of the result shows that the reverse is also true. For a range of » just below
^ », the globally optimal solution for the social planner is the step-by-step approach. However, for »
in this range there exists a jump equilibrium. Hence, it is possible for the market to move too fast.
E. An Unbounded Location Space
This subsection considers an alternative version of the model where the location space is
unbounded; i.e., the location space is [0;1) instead of [0;»]. Eliminating the endpoint eliminates
the horizon e¤ect in the analysis. New suppliers can shift over by a constant amount z in each
period without the economy ever running into a bound. Considering this alternative version of the
model facilitates the analysis of the case where the discount factor ± is positive. By considering this
case, I am able to derive a number of comparative statics results.
For this subsection, I return to the case where assemblers have the production function given
by (2) and the elasticity of assembly supply is Á: (The results also apply in the alternative case
where supply is inelastic.)
Consider a planner’s problem of selecting an assembly point ca
1 = ca in period 1 and a constant
step size z, so that the assembly center point is ca
t = ca + (t ¡ 1)z in period t and new suppliers
shift over by z in each period. Suppose the objective of the planner is to maximize the discounted
sum of total assembler and total supplier pro…t. It is straightforward to show that if the minimum
18cost to construct a delivered unit of the composite input in period t is vt, then the sum of assembler




for some constant k > 0. Along the step-by-step path, the composite cost falls at the rate
vt+1 = e¡µzvt. (11)




where v1(z;ca) is the minimum composite cost in period 1 as a function of z and ca. It is clear
that there does not exist a solution to the social planner’s problem. By making the step size z
arbitrarily large, the planner can make the average composite cost vt arbitrarily close to zero and
make discounted pro…ts arbitrarily large.
Consider next a constrained planner’s problem
max
z·¾, ca W(z;ca): (12)
In this problem, the planner is constrained to keep the step size no bigger than ¾. This requires that
the generations of suppliers overlap. This might be a reasonable constraint to impose if we think
about the points x on the location space as technologies. In this interpretation, the assumption
amounts to a constraint that no technologies be skipped. There is a quality ladder, and society has
to go through each of the rungs on the ladder as in Grossman and Helpman (1991).
The next proposition states the result of this section.
Proposition 9. Take as given the model parameters ¹, ¿, ¾, ±, and Á. There exists a ^ µ > 0, such
that if µ < ^ µ, there exists a unique step-by-step equilibrium with a constant step z¤ < ¾. There
also exists a unique optimum to the constrained social planner’s problem (12), and the planner’s
constrained optimum coincides with the equilibrium. For µ in the range (0;^ µ) the equilibrium step
size z¤ has the following comparative statics properties. It decreases with ¹ and ¿. It increases with
µ, ±, and Á.
According to the proposition, if the rate µ at which cost falls is not too big, there exists
a unique step-by-step equilibrium. The equilibrium step size coincides with the planner’s optimal
step, given that the planner is constrained from making a jump and must pursue a step-by-step
19strategy instead. The model has intuitive comparative statics properties. The more important the
agglomeration economies, through either the preference-for-variety parameter ¹ or transportation
costs ¿, the slower the migration. The more cost falls as one moves south, the more important the
future; and the greater the responsiveness of assembly supply to the delivered composite price, the
faster the migration.
4. Concluding Remarks
A large recent literature emphasizes that historical accidents can trap economies in ine¢cient
agglomerations. In this paper, I modify a standard model in the literature by …rst assuming that
space is a continuum and second assuming that it is infeasible for the entire economy to agglomerate
at a single point. Under these two reasonable assumptions, I show that the economy can always
…nd its way out of the trap.
I think more research with this kind of model is warranted because studying the forces
highlighted in this model may help us understand trends in important industries like the automobile
industry and the computer industry.
Consider, for example, the U.S. automobile industry. Access to local suppliers in this industry
has become increasingly important due to the adoption of just-in-time production methods (see
Rubenstein (1992)). For a number of years most of this industry was concentrated in Michigan.
But the new assembly plants built since the 1980s have gradually shifted the center of this industry
in the direction of the South. The …rst Japanese transplant assembly plant was the Honda plant in
southern Ohio. By picking an Ohio location, Honda obtained access to the network of suppliers that
existed in Michigan and northern Ohio and spurred the entry of new suppliers in southern Ohio.
Subsequent Japanese plants were built in Tennessee and Kentucky. The most recent new automobile
plant to be announced is the Mercedes plant in Alabama. Alabama would have been an unlikely
choice for an automobile plant 15 years ago. The choice is not so unthinkable now given the supplier
network that has emerged in Tennessee. The automobile industry appears to be experiencing a
step-by-step migration that parallels, to some extent, the migration in the model economy.
Next consider the computer industry. There certainly has been much discussion about net-
work externalities in the adoption of standards for operating systems for computers. It is possible to
reinterpret the location space in my model as a space of computer standards. Think of a specialized
supplier in the model as a specialized piece of software. A piece of software is near a standard if is
designed to work under the standard. Most existing software has been written in 16-bit code for use
20with DOS and Microsoft Windows 3.1. Microsoft NT is a superior operating system because it is
completely 32-bit. However, the old 16-bit software does not always work well on NT. Rather than
have us jump from DOS to NT, the social planner (a.k.a. Bill Gates) has engineered a step-by-step
migration between these two standards with the introduction of Windows 95. Windows 95 was
explicitly written to run the old 16-bit software well and also serve as a platform for 32-bit software.
But it is something less than a full 32-bit operating system. As more 32-bit software is written, we
will become less dependent upon the 16-bit software, and eventually we can all take the next step
to a fully 32-bit operating system like NT.
One of the most controversial issues in the computer industry is the dominance of Microsoft.8
Some people think that Apple’s Macintosh standard is inherently superior to the Microsoft stan-
dard. In their view, Microsoft’s dominance of the market is a bad equilibrium arising from network
externalities in the widespread adoption of a standard. The model that I have presented here in its
current form is not suitable for analysis of this issue. There is no analog in the model of two large
players battling it out. But I think some of the ideas of this paper may be relevant here. Those
who worry that we will be stuck forever with an ine¢cient Microsoft technology make a mistake in
characterizing the market as having two discrete alternative standards, Macintosh versus Microsoft.
In reality, there is a continuum of standards made up of convex combinations of these two cases.
Microsoft has gradually changed its standards in a step-by-step fashion, from DOS to Windows 3.1
to Windows 95, to emulate the good things about the Macintosh.
8See, for example, Taylor (1993) and Gleick (1995) for articles with the the titles “The Microsoft monopoly: How
do you restrain an 800-pound gorilla?” and “What to do with the Microsoft monster.”
21Appendix
Lemma 1. Take as given that suppliers locate on the interval [cs ¡ ¾
2;cs + ¾
2] with center cs and
that suppliers price according to (3). The cost of the composite intermediate v(x) is u-shaped as a
function of x; and the minimum is attained at a point ca¤ strictly greater than the supplier network
center cs. Furthermore, v(cs + y) < v(cs ¡ y) for all y > 0; i.e., the composite cost at a location y
units south of the center is less than the composite cost at a location y units north of the center.
Proof. It is obvious that v(x) is strictly decreasing for x < cs ¡ ¾
2 and strictly increasing for x >
cs + ¾
2. So consider a location point xa in the interior of the supply network (cs ¡ ¾
2;cs + ¾
2). Let
h(x;xa) denote the optimal purchases from a supplier located at x for an assembler at xa. The
assembler sets the MRS between an input produced at its location xa and an input produced at















Let x= cs¡ ¾
2 and x = cs + ¾
2 be the endpoints of the interval containing the supplier network. The
















































22Assemblers will select their locations to minimize v(xa), which, since ¹ > 1, is equivalent to maxi-













































































Straightforward di¤erentiation shows that F is strictly decreasing in xa. It is also straightforward
to show that F(x + ¾





imply that there is a unique xa¤ maximizing u(xa) that satis…es xa¤ > x+ ¾
2 = cs. This proves that
u(xa) is single-peaked and that the maximum is south of the center cs, which in turn implies that
v(xa) is u-shaped with a minimum south of the center cs. The result that v(cs + y) < v(cs ¡ y) for
y > 0 follows from straightforward but tedious calculations using the formula (17).¥
Lemma 2. Suppose that Case 1 applies and that all assemblers are concentrated at the point ca.




where k is a positive constant that is independent of x. This function is single-peaked and has the
property that ¼s(ca + y) > ¼s(ca ¡ y) for all y > 0.
Proof. Let ~ ¼(x;xa) be the pro…t a supplier located at x obtains from sales to an assembler located
at xa. I …rst show that this pro…t takes the following form:







23where h(xa;xa) is what an assembler located at xa would purchase from a supplier at xa if such a
supplier existed. To see that (21) must hold, note that for every one unit that is delivered, e¿jxa¡xj
needs to be shipped because of the transportation cost. Recall that the marginal cost at x is e¡µx
and that the price is a markup ¹ over this. Since an assembler at xa purchases h(x;xa) units from
a supplier at x, the supplier’s pro…t from these sales is
~ ¼(x;xa) = (¹ ¡ 1)e¡µxe¿jxa¡xjh(x;xa);
which reduces to (21) when the formula (13) for h(x;xa) is substituted in. Suppose, then, as
stipulated in the lemma, that the entire measure ® of assemblers is concentrated at a point ca. The





for k de…ned by





Proposition 1. Assume that Case 1 applies. There exists a unique equilibrium. In the equilibrium
allocation, suppliers locate on the interval [» ¡ ¾;»] with center cs¤ ´ » ¡ ¾
2 at the southernmost
end of the location space. Assemblers locate at a point ca¤ satisfying ca¤ > » ¡ ¾
2 ´ cs¤.
Proof : Following the arguments given in the text, the only thing I need to show here is that there
cannot exist an equilibrium with suppliers located on some subset L of the location space which
is di¤erent from [» ¡ ¾;»]. Suppose this is not true and there exists an equilibrium with supplier
locations L 6= [» ¡ ¾;»]. De…ne xs to be the in…mum over the set of equilibrium locations L. Since
L 6= [» ¡ ¾;»], xs < » ¡ ¾.








Let u¤ be the maximum of u(xa) over the unit interval. Let xa be the minimum xa such that
u(xa) = u¤: (By the continuity of u(xa); such a minimum must exist.)
24The …rst step is to prove that xs < xa. Suppose not, that xa · xs. This says that all
suppliers are south of xa. It is straightforward to show that u(xa) is strictly increasing in xa at xa.
This contradicts the de…nition of xa of being in the set of maximizers of u(xa). Hence, xs < xa.
I next claim that (xs;xa] µ L; i.e., there must be suppliers in the interval of points between
xs and xa. Let ¼(x) be the pro…t to a supplier at location x. Since all assemblers are at xa or south
of xa, it is immediate that ¼(x) is strictly increasing in x on the interval (xs;xa]. Since the pro…t at
all points (xs;xa] is strictly greater than at xs and since xs is the in…mum of where suppliers locate,
from the de…nition of equilibrium all points (xs;xa] must be occupied by suppliers.
I next claim there must exist a nonempty set of locations south of xa that are not in L. This
follows since xs < » ¡ ¾, since (xs;xa] µ L, and since the measure of L is ¾. Let x0 be the in…mum
of the set of points x > xa that are not in L.
I next claim that






must hold. To see this, note that by the de…nition of xs and x0 the interval (xs;x0) is completely
occupied by suppliers (i.e., (xs;x0) µ L), and furthermore, there are no suppliers below xs. Consider
…rst what assembler location preferences would be if I were to truncate the supplier distribution
and throw out all suppliers located above x0. Let ~ L = (xs;x0) be this truncated distribution. Let
u(xa; ~ L) be the assembler utility of location xa given this set of supplier locations ~ L. Follow the same
proof as in Lemma 1: there is a unique maximum ~ xa of u(~ xa; ~ L) satisfying ~ xa > xs + 1
2 (x0 ¡ xs).
Consider two points x1 and x2 such that x1 < x2 · x0. Using the formula (22) for the location
utility function gives






















= u(x2; ~ L) ¡ u(x1;~ L):
The inequality holds because for any x in L that is not in ~ L, the term in brackets is positive (for any
such x, x ¸ x2 > x1). This says that if an assembler prefers x2 to an x1 when x1 < x2 · x0 holds
given truncated supplier distribution ~ L, then the consumer prefers x2 to x1 at the actual supplier
distribution L. Since the maximum ~ xa of u(xa; ~ L) satis…es ~ xa > xa + 1
2 (x0 ¡ xa), it cannot be true
that a maximum of u(xa;L) satis…es xa · xa + 1
2 (x0 ¡ xa). This implies that (23) holds as claimed.
25I next show that ¼s(x0) > ¼s(xs). Inequality (23) implies that at any location xa where there
is an assembler, the location is closer to x0 than to xs. Since x0 > xa also holds, Lemma 2 then
implies that the pro…t ¼(x0;xa) to a supplier at x0 from sales to xa is greater than the pro…t ¼(xa;xa)
to a supplier at xs from sales to xa. Since this comparison is true for all xa where consumers locate,
¼s(x0) > ¼s(xs) must hold.
Recall that x0 is the in…mum of locations above xa that are not in L while xs is the in…mum
of locations in L. The fact that ¼s(x0) > ¼s(xs) and the continuity of ¼s imply that there exists
a point in L with strictly less pro…t than a point outside of L. This contradicts the de…nition of
equilibrium and completes the proof of the proposition.¥
Lemma 3. Assume that Case 2 applies and that ® · ¾. Assume that suppliers and assemblers
are distributed on the intervals [cs ¡ ¾
2;cs + ¾
2] and [ca ¡ ®
2;ca + ®
2] and that cs ¸ ca. Under these
assumptions, ¼s(cs + ¾
2) > ¼s(cs ¡ ¾
2).
Proof. The proof has two parts. Part 1 treats the case of Á ¸ ¸. Part 2 treats the case of Á 2 (1;¸).
Part 1: The Case of Á ¸ ¸
For this case I prove a slightly more general result that I later use in the proof of Proposition
3. The more general result is that for Á ¸ ¸ and ® · ¾ and any y > 0, ¼s(cs +y) > ¼s(cs ¡y). The
proof for this claim has six steps.
Step 1






To prove this, note …rst that
h(xa;xa) = m(xa)g(xa;xa), (25)
where m(xa) is the demand for delivered units of the composite for an assembler located at xa and
g(x;xa) is the amount of the specialized input produced at x in the cost-minimizing bundle of inputs
at location xa used to construct one unit of the composite. Recall that the assembler production
function is q = m
Á¡1















26The …rst equality follows from the FONC for the pro…t-maximizing choice of m. The second in-
equality follows from the de…nition (16) of u(xa).




By de…nition, the combination of the input levels g(x;xa) at xa must construct one unit of the
























where the third equality follows from the de…nition (16) of u(xa). Solving (28) for g(xa;xa) and








This step shows that




This follows from substituting (24) into (21).
Step 3
De…ne new parameters ! ´ Á(¹ ¡ 1) ¡ ¹ and ¯ = 1
¹¡1. The assumption that Á ¸ ¸ is
equivalent to the assumption that ! ¸ 0. Assume that y 2 (0; ®











e¡¯jxa¡ca+yju(xa)!dxa ¸ 0. (30)






















e¡¯j~ xa¡ca+yju(2ca ¡ ~ xa)!d~ xa:
(31)
27The second term of the second equality follows from making the substitution ~ xa = 2ca ¡ xa














e¡¯j~ xa¡ca¡yju(2ca ¡ ~ xa)!d~ xa:
(32)























e¡¯j~ xa¡ca+yj ¡ e¡¯j~ xa¡ca¡yj¤







[u(2ca ¡ xa)! ¡ u(xa)!]dxa:
The …rst bracketed term in the integral is positive since y 2 (0; ®
2]. The second bracketed term is
also positive. This follows since Lemma 1 and ca = cs imply that u(2ca ¡xa)¡u(xa) > 0. The fact
that ! ¸ 0 then implies that u(2ca ¡ xa)! ¡ u(xa)! ¸ 0. This proves that (30) holds.
Step 4
This step shows that for y 2 (0; ®
2] and cs = ca; ¼(cs + y) > ¼(cs ¡ y) as claimed in the
lemma. This follows because


















The equality follows from using the formula for each ~ ¼(x;xa) from (29). The inequality follows from






This step considers the case of y > ®
2, continuing the assumption that ca = cs. For such y,
the formula for ~ ¼(x;xa) from (29) implies that















These relations and the fact that ¼(ca+ ®
2) > ¼(ca¡ ®
2) holds from Step 4 then imply that ¼(ca+y) >
¼(ca ¡ y). Hence, the steps up to this point have shown that ¼(cs + y) > ¼(cs ¡ y), for cs = ca for
any y > 0.
28Step 6
This step shows that the result holds for ca > cs. Note …rst that if ¿ · µ, then the pro…t
¼(cs + y) is obviously greater than ¼(cs ¡ y) because a producer at cs + y has lower delivered cost
than a producer at cs ¡ y for all locations in the economy. So assume that ¿ > µ.
Let ^ ¼(x;xa;xa) be pro…t at location x when the assemblers locate on the interval [xa;xa]. I
need to show that for ca > cs,












) > 0: (33)
Suppose …rst that ca ¡ ®
2 ¸ cs ¡ µ
¿y or ca ¸ cs + ®
2 ¡ µ
¿y. It is straightforward to calculate
that the cost (including production and transportation cost) to a supplier at cs ¡y to deliver a unit
of input to the northernmost assembler at ca ¡ ®
2 is at least as great as the cost to a supplier at
cs + y. It follows immediately that total pro…ts must be higher at cs + y than at cs ¡ y.
Now consider the case where ca 2 (cs;cs + ®
2 ¡ µ
¿y). I need to show that (33) holds. From
Step 5, I know that (33) holds for ca = cs. So it is su¢cient to show that the LHS of (33) increases
in ca for ca in the speci…ed range. The slope of the LHS of (33) is
d^ ¼(cs + y)
dca ¡
d^ ¼(cs ¡ y)
dca =
@^ ¼(cs + y)
@xa +
@^ ¼(cs + y)
@xa ¡
@^ ¼(cs ¡ y)
@xa ¡
@^ ¼(cs ¡ y)
@xa (34)
= [~ ¼(cs + y;xa) ¡ ~ ¼(cs ¡ y;xa)]
+[~ ¼(cs ¡ y;xa) ¡ ~ ¼(cs + y;xa)]:
For ca in the speci…ed range, cs¡y < cs+y < xa and xa < cs¡ µ
¿y. These imply that both bracketed
terms in (34) are strictly positive, so that the LHS of (33) is strictly increasing. Put in another way,
a supplier at cs + y makes more pro…t on the southernmost assembler xa than the cs ¡ y supplier
does and less pro…t on the northernmost assembler xa. So if the distribution of assemblers is shifted
south, then the net increase in pro…t for the cs +y supplier is bigger than the net increase in pro…t
for the cs ¡ y supplier.
This concludes the proof for part 1 of the lemma.
Part 2: The Case of Á 2 (1;¸)
If I can show that the result holds for ca = cs, then the case of ca > cs follows from the
argument in Step 6 above. So assume that ca = cs. I need to show that ¼(ca + ®
2) > ¼(ca ¡ ®
2). I



















29and I can write ¼(ca ¡ ®
2) in an analogous way. Hence, to show that ¼(ca + ®
2) > ¼(ca ¡ ®
2), it is




;ca + z) > ~ ¼(ca ¡
®
2
;ca ¡ z) (35)
for all z 2 [¡®
2; ®
2].











2 ¡z)][u(ca ¡ z)]
Á(¹¡1)¡¹ ;









Note that since Á < ¸, Á(¹ ¡ 1) ¡ ¹ < 0 (recall that ¸ ´
¹
¹¡1). If z · 0, then from Lemma 1,
u(ca ¡ z) > u(ca + z). The fact that Á(¹ ¡ 1) ¡ ¹ < 0 then implies that the RHS of (36) is less
than one. The RHS is strictly greater than one, so the inequality holds if z · 0. It remains to
consider the case where z > 0. In this case, the term in brackets on the RHS is less than one. Since









Since Á > 1, since the LHS is increasing in Á; and since the RHS is independent of Á, it is su¢cient












































(¹ ¡ 1)G(xa;x;x); (41)






















¹¡1µ2zG(ca + z;ca ¡ ¾
2;ca + ¾
2)




Since z · ®
2, to prove (42) it is su¢cient to show that




































where the equality uses the de…nition of G. It is straightforward to show that (43) holds by showing
…rst that at z = 0 the RHS of (43) is zero and that it is strictly increasing in z for z · ¾
2.¥
Proposition 3. Assume that Case 2 applies, that ® · ¾, and that Á ¸ ¸. There exists an
equilibrium where suppliers occupy the interval [» ¡¾;»] at the south end of the location spectrum.
Proof. Take as given that suppliers occupy the interval [» ¡¾;»]. Lemma 1 and the fact that ® · ¾
imply that assemblers will occupy an interval [ca ¡ ®
2;ca + ®
2] with a center south of the supplier
center, ca ¸ » ¡ ¾
2.
Suppose it is optimal for suppliers to locate at [» ¡ ¾;»], if assemblers are in an interval
[ca ¡ ®
2;ca + ®
2] with a center at the supplier center, ca = cs = » ¡ ¾
2. Then by arguments similar
to those used in Step 6 of the proof of Lemma 3, it continues to be optimal for suppliers to locate
there for any assembly center south of the supplier center, ca ¸ cs. Hence, it is su¢cient to show
that [» ¡ ¾;»] is optimal for suppliers, when ca = cs. This is what I will show.
It is clear that ¼s(x) is increasing for x < » ¡ ¾. So to prove that [» ¡ ¾;»] are the pro…t-
maximizing locations, it is su¢cient to show that
¼s(x) > ¼s(» ¡ ¾) (44)
for all x > » ¡ ¾. I will show that ¼s(x) is strictly increasing for x 2 (» ¡ ¾;cs). This, along with
the result from Part 1 of the proof of Lemma 3 that ¼s(cs+y) > ¼s(cs¡y) when cs = ca and y > 0;
will imply that (44) holds.
Using the formula (29) for ~ ¼(x;xa) and integrating over the interval of assembler locations












31Letting ¯ ´ 1











From inspection of (45), to show that ¼s(x) is increasing over the range x 2 (»¡¾;ca), it is su¢cient
to show that H(x) is weakly increasing over this range. For x 2 (» ¡ ¾;ca ¡ ®
2], H(x) is obviously
increasing. So consider x 2 (ca ¡ ®



































































e¡¯(x¡xa)(u(2x ¡ xa)! ¡ u(xa)!)dxa
#
:
By Lemma 1, u(2x¡xa) > u(xa), for x 2 (ca¡ ®
2;ca) and xa 2 (ca¡ ®
2;x). Since ! ¸ 0, this implies
that u(2x ¡ xa)! ¡ u(xa)! ¸ 0. Hence, H0(x) > 0 for x in this range as claimed. This completes
the proof of Part 2.¥
Proposition 5. Suppose that in the initial state, old suppliers occupy the interval [0;¾]. In any
unfragmented equilibrium, there exists a critical time period t0 where t0 · ^ t, such that in any period
t ¸ t0, all new suppliers locate on the interval [»¡¾;»] at the south end of the location space. Before




2] with center cs
t, and this center shifts
south by at least µ¾
2¿ in each period, i.e., cs
t > cs
t¡1 + µ¾
2¿, for t · t0.





2]. In any equilibrium, the interval of new entrants must be located at
least µ¾
2¿ units further south than the old suppliers if this is feasible, and otherwise the new entrants
are located at [» ¡¾;»]. Furthermore, the pro…t in period t of an old supplier at cs
t¡1 + ¾
2 is strictly
greater than the pro…t of an old supplier at cs
t¡1 ¡ ¾
2.
Note that the claim is obvious if ¿ · µ, so assume that ¿ > µ.
I …rst show that this claim is true for t = T. Suppose that assemblers locate at ca
T in period
T. It is straightforward to show that Lemma 2 applies in this case, so the pro…t function for period












2¿] if this interval
is contained within the location space, and otherwise they will locate at [» ¡ ¾;»]. Hence, if new
suppliers do not locate at [»¡¾;»], assemblers locate at a point ca
T that is ¾µ
2¿ units north of the center




T¡1, assemblers would be
locating north of the old-supplier center cs
T¡1 as well as the new-supplier center. A straightforward
extension of Lemma 1 would show that this contracts optimal assembler location behavior. The
claim that the pro…t of an old supplier at cs
t¡1+ ¾
2 is strictly greater than the pro…t of an old supplier
at cs
t¡1 ¡ ¾
2 follows from the fact that ca
T > cs
T¡1.
Now suppose that the claim is true for some t + 1. I will show the result is true for t. By
induction the result will be true for all t. Since the claim is true for t+1, I know that for suppliers
that enter in period t, the pro…t in t+1 is higher for the supplier that located at cs
t + ¾
2 than for the
supplier at cs
t ¡ ¾
2. I will use this fact shortly. Now note that if the new suppliers locate at [»¡¾;»];
the result is true, so suppose that new suppliers locate at some interval with center cs
t < » ¡ ¾
2. Let
ca
t denote the location of assemblers in period t. I show that ca
t + ¾µ
2¿ · cs
t must hold. Suppose it did
not. The formula for pro…t in period t is proportional to (46). Hence, if ca
t + ¾µ
2¿ > cs
t, a new supplier
at cs
t + ¾
2 would make strictly greater pro…t in period t than a supplier at cs
t ¡ ¾
2. As mentioned





2. This is inconsistent with equilibrium if cs
t + ¾




By the same argument used in the t = T case, ca
t ¸ cs
t¡1 must hold. This proves the claim.
Proposition 6. Assume that µ is small enough that (9) holds. Assume that ± = 0. There exists a
critical level ^ » of » where ^ » > ¾ with the following properties. If » < ^ », the unique solution to the
33social planner’s problem speci…es that the supplier center shift by a constant step z¤ < ¾ in each
period, cs
t = cs
t¡1+z¤, until the endpoint is reached where all suppliers are located at the south end
[» ¡ ¾;»]. If » > ^ », the unique solution speci…es that in the initial period the new suppliers jump
to the south end [» ¡¾;»] of the location spectrum and that all future generations of suppliers also
locate there.
Proof. The social planner’s problem is reduced to picking a ca
t in each period and new-supplier
locations according to (7) and (8) to maximize assembler pro…t in a period. (Note that supplier
pro…t is proportional to assembler pro…t.)
Consider the initial period where the old suppliers are at [0;¾]. Following earlier arguments,
we know that the location ca
1 that maximizes assembler pro…t in period 1 is the location that
maximizes
U1(ca) = u(ca;0;¾) +u(ca;xs(ca);xs(ca)); (47)
where xs(ca) and xs(ca) are de…ned by (7) and (8) and u(ca;x;x) is de…ned by (16). It is straight-










Inspection of (48) and (49) reveals that U1(ca) is strictly convex for ca 2 [¾;» ¡ ¾
2 + µ¾
2¿ ]. Hence, in
the social planner’s solution the optimum must be either ca < ¾, or ca > » ¡ ¾
2 + µ¾
2¿ . The latter
case corresponds to putting the assemblers in [» ¡ ¾;»].
It is obvious that if » is large enough, the planner will put the new suppliers at [» ¡ ¾;»]. It
is also clear that if this is optimal for some »0, it is optimal for all » > »0. Hence, there must exist
a ^ » > ¾ such that if » > ^ », then the optimal choice in the initial period is to put the suppliers at
[» ¡ ¾;»], and if » < ^ » it is optimal to set ca < ¾. This proves that the result holds for the initial
period. The case for later periods follows from the argument given in the body of this paper.
Proposition 9
This subsection contains the proof of Proposition 9.
In period 1, the initial period, the current generation of old suppliers is located at [0;¾]. The
new suppliers take a step z and locate at [z;z+¾]. Assemblers locate at a point ca. In a step-by-step
34equilibrium, the generation of new suppliers that arrives in period 2 takes the same size step as the
new suppliers in period 1; i.e., they locate in the interval [2z;2z + ¾]. Furthermore, assemblers in
period 2 take the same size step and locate at ca + z. Analogously, in period 3, suppliers locate at
[3z;3z + ¾], and so forth.
If a step z is consistent with optimal behavior for the agents in period 1, then the step z
is consistent with optimal behavior for the agents in later periods, since the objective functions
for the later agents are the same as the objective functions for the agents in period 1, except for
a multiplicative constant that depends upon µ and z. Therefore, to determine the conditions for
a step-by-step equilibrium, it is su¢cient to look at the behavior of the agents in period 1. In
particular, it must be pro…t-maximizing for the new suppliers in period 1 to locate at [z;z+¾], and
it must be pro…t-maximizing for assemblers to locate at ca in period 1.
The new suppliers in period 1 care about their pro…ts in periods 1 and 2. In order to write
an expression for pro…t, let me …rst de…ne ha
t as the demand of an assembler in period t for units
of specialized inputs from the supplier sharing the same location ca
t as the assembler in period t.
Using the formula for the single-period pro…t (20), we know that the discounted pro…t of a supplier





















To see this, note that since the entire economy shifts south by the amount z between period 1 and
period 2, the minimum delivered cost at the assembly center to construct one unit of the composite




The relation (51) then follows because the assembler’s elasticity of demand for units of the composite










35Since new suppliers in period 1 locate on the interval [z;z + ¾], a necessary condition for
equilibrium is that pro…t be equal at the endpoint z and z + ¾ of the interval; i.e.,
¼(z) ¡ ¼(z + ¾) = 0. (54)




· ca · ¾: (55)
I will show later that for small µ this is a necessary condition for equilibrium. This assumption
implies that a supplier at the endpoint z of the new-supplier interval [z;z + ¾] is further north
than the assembly centers in both periods and that the supplier at the other endpoint z + ¾ is
further south than the assembly centers in both periods. Knowing this enables me to order the
di¤erences within the absolute value expressions in (53) so that I can take out the absolute value
symbols. Substituting (53) into (54) and dividing by common factors yields the following condition
for equilibrium in the choices of the supplier locations as a function of the step z and the center ca:
S(z;ca) = 0,


















I now turn to the condition for optimal assembler behavior. Recall the earlier analysis of
average total cost (14) in the static model with a single interval of suppliers. It is straightforward to
generalize this formula to the case where there is a set of suppliers [0;¾] and a second set at [g;g+¾].
Following the earlier analysis, the location that minimizes ATC is the location that maximizes
U(xa) = u(xa;0;¾) + u(xa;z;z + ¾); (57)









[F(ca;0;¾) + F(ca;z;z +¾)] = 0;
which uses the formula (18) for the slope. Taking (58) and substituting in the formula (19) for
F(xa;x;x) and dividing by common factors yields the following condition for equilibrium in the
36assembly sector:
A(z;ca) = 0;
























Consider the polar case of µ± = 0. Let z± = 0 and ca± = ¾




Hence, the necessary conditions for an equilibrium are satis…ed. It is straightforward to show that
the su¢cient conditions for an equilibrium are also satis…ed, e.g., that ca± = ¾
2 is the unique globally
optimal choice of assemblers given that the step size is z± = 0. Now consider what happens for
small positive µ. Straightforward di¤erentiation of S and A shows that the following are true when




















A standard application of the implicit function theorem shows that for small µ there exist unique
functions z¤(µ) and ca¤(µ) satisfying the necessary conditions
A(z¤(µ);ca¤(µ);µ) = 0
S(z¤(µ);ca¤(µ);µ) = 0







37It is straightforward to show that for small µ, z¤(µ) and ca¤(µ) satisfy the su¢cient condition for an
equilibrium. I claim that for small µ this is the unique equilibrium. Suppose not. Then for each
n, there exists a µn < 1
n, with at least one step-by-step equilibrium (zn;ca
n) besides (z¤(µ);ca¤(µ)).
By the implicit function theorem this other equilibrium must be outside a ball around the limit
point (z±;ca±) = (0; ¾
2). By the de…nition of a step-by-step equilibrium, zn 2 [0;¾]; and this implies
that ca
n 2 [0;2¾]. Since the sequence fzn;ca
ng is bounded, there exists a convergent subsequence.
Let (z1;ca
1) be the limit of this convergent sequence. Since every element of the subsequence is
bounded away from (z±;ca±) = (0; ¾
2), the limit is bounded away from (z±;ca±) = (0; ¾
2); i.e., z1 > 0
and ca
1 > ¾
2. Since µn converges to zero, (z1;ca
1) must be an equilibrium in the case where µ = 0.
But straightforward analysis shows that for ± < 1, there can be no such alternative equilibrium in
the µ = 0 case. This shows that the equilibrium (z¤(µ);ca¤(µ)) is the unique equilibrium for small µ.
The comparative statics claims follow from the following. It is straightforward to show that
for µ > 0 and any (z;ca) satisfying 0 < z < ¾









These relations, along with (60), imply that z¤ strictly increases in ± and Á for small µ.
With the help of MAPLE (a computer program for symbolic manipulation), it can be shown

























Straightforward arguments using L’Hospital’s rule show that these imply that z¤ strictly decreases in
¿ and ¹ for small µ. This completes the proof of the comparative statics results stated in Proposition
9.
It remains to show that for small enough µ, there is a unique solution to the constrained
social planner’s problem and that this solution coincides with the equilibrium allocation. Let wt be





for some k > 0. Consider the problem of a social planner picking a step size z and an assembly
center ca in period 1 (implying an assembly center ca +(t ¡ 1)z in period t) to maximize
W(z;ca) = w1 +±w2 + ±2w3 + ::::
Let ~ W(z) be de…ned as follows:
~ W(z;µ) ´ max
c W(z;ca;µ).




It is straightforward to show that in the limiting case of µ = 0, the unique solution to this problem







By the implicit function theorem, by continuity, and by the fact that z = 0 is the unique solution
for µ = 0, for small µ there exists a unique z¤
planner(µ) solving (62).
The …nal thing to prove in the proposition is that z¤
planner(µ) = z¤
equilibrium(µ). Note that for
a given z, the social planner’s choice of c must be the cost-minimizing level, i.e., the choice of c
must satisfy A(z;c) = 0. So I need to show that S(z;c) = 0. To show this is the case, take as given
that the planner is setting the assembly centers at the levels ca
t = c¤ + (t ¡ c)z¤ in each period and
that beginning in period t = 2, the planner will locate the new suppliers entering in period t on the
interval [tz¤;¾ + tz¤]; i.e., zt = z¤, for t ¸ 2. If z¤ and c¤ are a solution to the constrained social
planner’s problem, it must be optimal to set z1 = z¤ in period 1, if we take this other stu¤ as given.
Discounted pro…t as a function of the z1 in period 1 is
W(z1) = k¡(¹¡1)[u(c¤;0;¾) + u(c¤;z1;z1 + ¾)]
(¹¡1)(Á¡1) (63)
+ ±k¡(¹¡1) [u(c¤ + z¤;z1;z1 + ¾) + u(c¤ + z¤;2z¤;2z¤ + ¾)]
(¹¡1)(Á¡1)
+ discounted pro…t in period 3 and later.
39Note that a deviation in z1 in period 1 away from z¤ a¤ects discounted pro…t in period 1 and 2 but
does not a¤ect discounted pro…t in periods 3 or later. The formula (63) follows from (57), (14), and
(61).
In order that z1 = z¤ solve the planner’s problem, it must solve the …rst-order necessary
condition
W0(z¤) = 0.
Straightforward calculations show that this condition is equivalent to S(z¤;c¤) = 0. This completes
the proof.¥
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